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1Forthcoming in Benton E. Gup, ed., Corporate Governance in Banking: AGlobal Perspective (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2007)CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE      FAILURES AT UNIVERSAL BANKS DURING THE STOCKMARKET BOOM OF THE 1990s: THE CASES OFENRON AND WORLDCOMArthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.George Washington University Law SchoolWashington, DCNovember 20, 2006
INTRODUCTIONThe re-entry of commercial banks into the securities business transformed U.S.financial markets during the 1990s.  Beginning in the 1980s, federal regulators and courtsbegan to open loopholes in the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall), which hadeffectively banished commercial banks from the securities industry.  In 1989, the FederalReserve Board permitted bank holding companies to establish “Section 20 subsidiaries,”which could underwrite debt and equity securities to a limited extent.  By 1996, Section20 subsidiaries were able to compete effectively with securities firms as a result of theFederal Reserve’s liberalization of the rules governing those subsidiaries.  In 1998, theFederal Reserve took a more dramatic step by allowing Citicorp, the largest U.S. bankholding company, to merge with Travelers, a financial conglomerate that owned a majorsecurities firm, Salomon Smith Barney (SSB).  That merger produced Citigroup, the firstU.S. universal bank since 1933, and it placed great pressure on Congress to repeal Glass-Steagall.  In November 1999, Congress enacted the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA),which removed the most important Glass-Steagall barriers and allowed commercial
2banks to affiliate with securities firms and insurance companies by forming financialholding companies.1In adopting GLBA, Congress determined that the potential benefits of combiningcommercial and investment banking outweighed concerns about promotional pressuresand conflicts of interest that were reflected in Glass-Steagall.  Congress concluded in1999 that Glass-Steagall was obsolete and counterproductive.  Congress thereforedismissed the relevance of Glass-Steagall’s findings that the combination of commercialand investment banking during the 1920s had produced a wave of speculative financings,an unsustainable economic boom, and the distribution of high-risk securities that inflictedmassive losses on unsophisticated investors.2 GLBA essentially ratified the securities powers that bank holding companies hadalready obtained through the Federal Reserve’s Section 20 orders.  By 1999, forty-fivebanking organizations (including all of the twenty-five largest banks) had establishedSection 20 subsidiaries. Three of those banks – Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase (Chase)and Bank of America – ranked among the top ten underwriters for U.S. securities in1999.3  During 1999-2000, Citigroup’s investment banking fees exceeded $6.6 billionand accounted for more than a fifth of Citigroup’s total revenues.4  In 2000, Citigroup,Chase and Bank of America ranked among the top ten underwriters of global securities,along with three major foreign banks (Credit Suisse, Deutsche and UBS) and four U.S.securities firms (Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and Lehman Brothers). That group of top global underwriters remained essentially the same during 2001-05.5The six domestic and foreign banks included within that group achieved theirstatus in large part by acquiring securities firms in the United States and the United
3Kingdom.6  Leading securities firms responded to the banks’ competitive challenge byacquiring FDIC-insured depository institutions.  Securities firms were able to acquirethese bank-like institutions by taking advantage of loopholes in the statutes governingbank and thrift holding companies.  For example, Merrill Lynch acquired a thriftinstitution and an industrial loan company (ILC) during the 1990s.  Those institutionscurrently hold $80 billion of deposits, and Merrill Lynch uses their deposits as theprimary funding source for its commercial lending, consumer lending and bond tradingactivities.7  Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers and Goldman Sachs also own ILCs,although each of those ILCs currently holds less than $8 billion of deposits.8  Thus,Merrill Lynch certainly qualifies as a universal bank in terms of offering a full range ofbanking and securities services, and the other three major securities firms arguably fallwithin that category as well.Competition between commercial banks and securities firms helped to stimulate aspectacular growth in the issuance of corporate securities during the late 1990s.  Totalunderwritings and private placements of corporate securities in U.S. financial marketsmore than tripled, from $860 billion to $3.12 trillion, during 1994-2001.9  This rapidexpansion in corporate issues contributed to the stock market boom of 1994-2000, whichwas comparable to the great bull market of 1923-29.  Unfortunately, as in the 1920s, thestock market boom of the 1990s was followed by a sharp decline during 2000-02. During that decline, the total value of all publicly traded U.S. stocks fell by 40 percent,from $17 trillion to $10 trillion, representing the worst long-term decline in stock valuessince 1929-32.10
4The drop in stock prices accelerated between December 2001 and October 2002,as investors reacted to reports of accounting fraud and self-dealing at many “neweconomy” firms that had been viewed as “stars” during the stock market boom of the1990s.11  The sudden collapses of Enron and WorldCom were especially shocking toinvestors.  With assets of $63 billion and $104 billion, Enron and WorldCom representedthe largest corporate bankruptcies in U.S. history.12  Investigations and lawsuits revealedthat universal banks played central roles in financing the rapid growth of Enron andWorldCom, and in promoting the sale of their securities.  Government officials penalizeduniversal banks for their involvement with Enron and WorldCom, and officials alsobrought enforcement actions against universal banks for a wide range of othermisconduct related to their securities activities, including (i) conflicts of interest amongresearch analysts, resulting in the issuance of biased and misleading reports to investors,(ii) manipulative and abusive practices connected with initial public offerings (IPOs), and(iii) late trading, market timing and other abuses involving mutual funds.13 This chapter is part of a larger project that will examine the role of universalbanks during the U.S. economy’s boom-and-bust cycle of 1994-2002.  In particular, Iintend to consider whether the combination of commercial and investment bankingactivities during the 1990s created promotional pressures and conflicts of interest that (i)caused universal banks to underwrite risky securities and extend speculative loans, (ii)led universal banks to issue offering prospectuses and research reports that promoted thesale of those risky securities without proper disclosure of the investment risks, and (iii)induced universal banks to disregard legal prohibitions on deceptive practices and theirown policies against abusive transactions.  This chapter focuses on the involvement of
5universal banks with Enron and WorldCom.  While many scholars have analyzed theEnron and WorldCom scandals, to my knowledge only two legal academics – JamesFanto and Hillary Sale – have given substantial attention to the role of universal banks inthose scandals.14  The analysis in this chapter builds upon their important work.         The evidence presented below supports several conclusions.  First, the desire forinvestment banking fees caused universal banks to enter into structured-financetransactions with Enron, even though bank officials recognized that that the transactions(i) were inherently deceptive, (ii) were contrary to their banks’ risk management policiesand (iii) exposed their banks to serious reputational risk and legal liability.  Second,universal banks competed for investment banking mandates by providing extraordinaryfinancial favors to senior corporate executives of Enron and WorldCom, notwithstandingthe obvious corruption inherent in those favors.  Third, universal banks distributedoffering prospectuses and research reports that encouraged investors to buy Enron’s andWorldCom’s securities, even though bank officials knew or should have known that thepromotional documents were materially misleading and failed to disclose significantinvestment risks. Indeed, some banks quietly arranged hedging transactions to reducetheir credit exposures to Enron and WorldCom concurrently with their publication ofmaterials encouraging investors to buy the companies’ securities.  Other banks firedanalysts who published critical reports about Enron.  Finally, universal banks repeatedlyextended credit to Enron and WorldCom in order to attract investment banking business,even though bank officers had serious concerns about the financial viability of bothcompanies.  
6Thus, the Enron and WorldCom episodes demonstrated an appalling failure ofcorporate governance safeguards at universal banks as well as their clients.  The actionsof universal banks with respect to Enron and WorldCom also revealed the existence ofpromotional pressures, conflicts of interest, speculative financing and exploitation ofinvestors, which were similar to the perceived abuses that caused Congress to separatecommercial and investment banking in 1933.  Beyond the injuries suffered by investorsand the broader economy, the universal banks’ misconduct related to Enron andWorldCom raises troubling questions about the risks to the financial system created bythe commingling of commercial and investment banking.  By November 2006, universalbanks had paid $15 billion, and had surrendered creditor claims of about $3 billion, inorder to settle enforcement actions, civil lawsuits and bankruptcy proceedings related toEnron and WorldCom.  The losses suffered by universal banks, which have not yet beenfully determined, far exceed the fees they received from Enron and WorldCom.  Forexample, Enron and WorldCom paid Citigroup about $330 million, but Citigroup hasalready paid nearly $5 billion to settle claims related to its work for those companies.15 The magnitude of the foregoing losses indicates that GLBA’s regulatory scheme is notadequate to control the risks posed by universal banking powers to our largest banks –the same banks that are most likely to receive “too big to fail” treatment from financialregulators.16                        UNIVERSAL BANKS AND ENRONThe Rise and Fall of EnronEnron was one of the most glamorous and admired companies during the stockmarket boom of the late 1990s.  Enron’s reported revenues increased from less than $10
7billion in 1995 to $20 billion in 1997, $30 billion in 1998, $40 billion in 1999, and $100billion in 2000.  Enron’s market capitalization reached $70 billion at its peak in August2000.  Measured by reported revenues and market capitalization, Enron was the seventhlargest corporation in the United States.  For five consecutive years, from 1997 through2001, Fortune magazine ranked Enron as the “Most Innovative Company in America.”17Enron’s management, led by Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, transformedEnron from an operator of natural gas pipelines in the 1980s to a highly diversifiedcompany with four primary business segments at the end of the 1990s.  Enron’s majorsegments were (i) Transportation Services, which operated Enron’s traditional natural gaspipelines and an electric utility, (ii) Wholesale Services, which operated trading marketsfor futures contracts and other derivative instruments based on a wide range ofcommodities, (iii) Energy Services, which sold energy products to commercial and retailcustomers, and (iv) Broadband Services, which sought to be “the world’s largestmarketer of bandwidth and network services [and] … the world’s largest provider ofpremium content delivery services.”  Enron also made extensive “merchant investments”in a wide array of ventures, including foreign power plants, foreign water systems, andmany speculative, high-technology companies.18  By 2000, Enron’s highly-publicizedbusiness units for bandwidth trading and for providing broadband services to householdspersuaded Wall Street that Enron deserved an “Internet-style valuation,” which was farhigher than Enron could have achieved as an energy company.19 Enron also became a de facto financial institution by the late 1990s, due to itsheavy involvement in trading commodities and financial instruments.  Skilling was thearchitect of Enron’s financial services strategy, which grew out of his success in
8establishing a “gas bank” at Enron in the early 1990s.  The “gas bank” was veryprofitable, and Enron became the leading supplier of futures and other derivativecontracts for delivery of natural gas.  Enron tried to extend Skilling’s “gas bank” conceptby creating trading markets and risk management products for a wide variety ofcommodities, including electricity, water, pulp and paper, coal, steel and broadband. Skilling believed that Enron should buy “hard assets” in targeted industries solely for thepurpose of establishing a base for trading operations, and should then sell off the assetsafter it developed a trading capability.20  Skilling based his “asset light” strategy on the assumption that Enron could use itstrading expertise and Internet technology to “monetize” all types of assets.  Skilling wasconvinced that Enron had the potential to become the dominant trader for everyconceivable type of commodity or contract.21  In Enron’s 2000 annual report, thecompany proclaimed its “unrivaled access to markets and liquidity” and also declaredthat “[w]hen customers do business with Enron, they get our commitment to reliablydeliver their product at a predictable price, regardless of market conditions.”22  Enron pursued three additional strategies, which contained the seeds of itsdestruction.  First, Enron obtained permission from the Securities and ExchangeCommission (SEC) to adopt the mark-to-market (MTM) accounting method for certainof Enron’s trading activities.  Without seeking the SEC’s approval, Enron extendedMTM accounting to many of its other businesses.  By 2000, Enron accounted for morethan a third of its assets under the MTM method.  MTM accounting allowed Enron tocarry those assets at “fair value” based upon publicly quoted prices or (in most cases) itsown estimates of fair value.  Additionally, MTM accounting enabled Enron to record in a
9single year all the profits that it expected to accrue over the life of a financial contract,power plant or other newly-acquired asset.  Second, Enron’s compensation systemrewarded employees for increasing the company’s quarterly earnings, therebyencouraging Enron’s officers to make deals with the maximum short-term impact onprofits.  In combination, MTM accounting and Enron’s compensation system producedan aggressive, deal-oriented corporate culture in which managers approved contracts andauthorized new projects to achieve short-term earnings goals, with little or no regard forthe long-term viability of those ventures.23              Third, as stated in its 2000 annual report, Enron pledged that it would be “laser-focused on earnings per share,” and that it would maintain “investment grade status,”which was “critical to the success of [Enron’s] wholesale [trading] business as well as itsability to maintain adequate liquidity.”24  Enron’s commitment to produce steady growthin earnings per share (EPS) and to maintain an investment-grade credit rating made thecompany a favorite of institutional investors.  By late 2000, mutual funds, pension fundsand other institutional investors held 60 percent of Enron’s stock, and those investors didnot begin to abandon Enron until October 2001, after the company disclosed thataccounting violations would force it to write down its assets by more than $2 billion.25  Enron’s promises ultimately created a financial trap from which it could notescape without fraud.  Analysts and credit ratings agencies expected Enron to produceconsistent growth in cash flow revenues and EPS.  However, Enron’s MTM accountingproduced a mismatch between cash flow and earnings, because Enron reported MTMearnings well in advance of its receipt of actual revenues.  Many of Enron’s speculativeventures proved to be disappointments or outright disasters and did not produce the
10
expected revenues.  Enron therefore needed external funding sources to provide the cashflow that its internal operations failed to generate.  Enron’s management was unwilling toobtain the needed funds by issuing new stock, because that would dilute the company’sEPS.  Management was also unwilling to issue new debt, because that would undermineEnron’s investment-grade credit rating.26Because of its unwillingness to issue equity or debt, Enron entered into abewildering array of structured-finance transactions.  Enron’s structured-finance dealswere designed to achieve the following objectives: (i) to generate fictitious revenues andearnings, (ii) to obtain de facto loans while disguising Enron’s obligations to repay thoseloans, (iii) to move poorly-performing assets off Enron’s balance sheet into special-purpose entities (SPEs) controlled by Enron or its officers, and (iii) to create accountinghedges against declines in the MTM values of Enron’s more volatile assets.27  ByNovember 2001, Enron had accumulated actual debt obligations of $38 billion, but only$13 billion appeared on its balance sheet.28  Enron’s officers believed that the company’s structured-finance transactionswould provide “bridge” financing and would “maintain the impression that Enron washumming until . . . [the company] started raking in real profits” from the “big enchilada”projects conceived by Skilling.29  Unfortunately, Skilling’s projects failed, and the hoped-for profits did not materialize.30  When Enron finally began to disclose the magnitude ofits accounting manipulations in October 2001, the company quickly lost the confidenceof its investors, creditors and trading counterparties.  Enron filed for Chapter 11bankruptcy reorganization on December 2, 2001, shortly after last-ditch mergernegotiations with Dynegy failed.31  
11
Universal Banks as “Enablers” of Enron’s Fraud Neal Batson, Enron’s bankruptcy examiner, determined that “[t]here is sufficientevidence from which a fact-finder could conclude” that nine universal banks “had actualknowledge of the wrongful conduct of [Enron’s] officers” and “gave substantialassistance to the officers by participating in the structuring and closing of the SPEtransactions.”32  Similarly, Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind concluded that banks were“Enron’s enablers . . . the best supporting actors of the Enron scandal – without whosezealous participation Enron’s financial shenanigans would simply not have beenpossible.”33  Hillary Sale also agreed that “[b]anks were a significant part of what ‘wentwrong’ at Enron. . . . Without the banks, the [SPE] transactions would not haveoccurred.”34   Enron’s deal-focused culture and its constant need for new sources of financingmade it a favorite client of universal and investment banks.  “By the late 1990’s, Enronhad become one of the largest payers of investment banking fees in the world” andobtained services from more than seventy banks.35  Andrew Fastow, Enron’s chieffinancial officer, created a tournament that forced banks to compete against each otherfor Enron’s favor.  Fastow divided Enron’s banks into “Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3”, and abank could earn “Tier 1” status only if it was prepared “to lead/structure complex,mission-critical deals,” to “[u]nderwrite $1 billion in [a] short period of time,” and toprovide an “[a]ccount officer capable of delivering [the] institution” so that it would doEnron’s bidding.36  Many banks readily accepted Fastow’s terms, even though Enron wasa notoriously difficulty client.  As one banker said, “It was hell doing business with them,but you had to because they were so big.”37    
12
The Enron bankruptcy examiner’s reports provide detailed descriptions of theinvolvement of universal banks in Enron’s structured-finance deals.38  This chapterfocuses on four types of transactions, which banks arranged for Enron despite their clearawareness of the deception and corruption inherent in those transactions.First, Enron used prepaid commodity swaps (“prepays”) to obtain disguised loans. In the typical prepay, the lending bank transferred funds to a bank-controlled SPE, andthe SPE then “paid” those funds to Enron in exchange for Enron’s “agreement” to deliverspecified commodities.  A series of offsetting swap agreements among the bank, the SPEand Enron effectively eliminated Enron’s agreement to deliver the commodities andinstead obligated Enron to pay a fixed sum of money plus interest to the lending bank. Although the prepays were functionally equivalent to loans, Enron reported the proceedsas cash flow from operating activities and recorded its payment obligations as liabilitiesfrom “price risk management activities.”  Thus, prepays enabled Enron to inflate itsreported cash flow and to disguise its actual debt obligations.39  Citigroup and Chasearranged more than $8.3 billion of prepay transactions for Enron between 1992 and 2001. Barclays, Credit Suisse, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Toronto Dominion Bank alsoparticipated in prepay transactions.40  According to one Enron risk manager, “[t]he banksliked [prepays] because Enron got addicted . . . .  Enron had to repay the loan[s], but thecash flow didn’t materialize.  So [the prepays] snowballed.”41  “Minority interest transactions” were a second type of structured-finance devicethat provided disguised loans to Enron.  Citigroup provided $1.75 billion of de factoloans to Enron through three “minority interest transactions” that were completed at theend of 1997, 1998 and 1999.  Citigroup developed the concept for these transactions and
13
marketed the concept as a proprietary product.  In the 1999 transaction (known as ProjectNahanni), Citigroup provided a $485 million loan to Nahanni, an SPE established andcontrolled by Citigroup.  Citigroup also arranged for a group of investors to buy $15million of equity in Nahanni in order to meet the SEC’s three percent outside equityownership requirement for avoiding consolidation of Nahanni’s financial statements withthose of either Enron or Citigroup.  Nahanni used the funds it received from Citigroupand the investors to purchase $500 million of Treasury securities, which it thencontributed as a “minority investment” in Marengo, an Enron-controlled entity.  AtEnron’s direction, Marengo sold the Treasury bills on December 29, 1999, and Marengosent the $500 million sale proceeds to Enron.   In January 2000, Enron caused Marengo to “repurchase” Nahanni’s minorityinterest for $487.1 million.  Nahanni used those funds to repay Citigroup’s $485 millionloan together with $2.1 million in imputed interest.  Thus, in practical effect, Citigroupused Project Nahanni to provide a $485 million loan to Enron for a one-month period. However, Enron did not report Project Nahanni as a loan.  Instead, Enron reported the$500 million of Treasury bills contributed by Nahanni as a “minority interest” on its1999 balance sheet, which it then “repurchased” in 2000.  In addition, Enron reported thesale of the Treasury bills on its 1999 income statement as $500 million of cash flow from“merchant investment” activities.  Like the prepays, Project Nahanni and the other“minority interest” transactions inflated Enron’s reported cash flow while disguising itsactual debt.42           A third series of structured transactions enabled Enron to create fictitious “sales”of assets to Enron-controlled SPEs.  During 2000 alone, Enron relied on asset sales to
14
SPEs to increase its reported operating cash flow and its reported earnings by more than35%.43  For example, in Project Bacchus, Enron contributed its pulp and paper tradingbusiness to an off-balance-sheet SPE named Fishtail, in exchange for 80% of Fishtail’sequity.  Enron asserted that it did not have to consolidate Fishtail on its balance sheet,because three percent of Fishtail’s equity was held by LJM2, a purportedly independentpartnership that was actually controlled by Fastow.  On December 20, 2000, Enron soldits 80% interest in Fishtail for $200 million to Sonoma, another SPE.  Citigroup providedSonoma with a $194 million loan and a $6 million equity infusion, thereby enablingSonoma to “buy” Enron’s interest in Fishtail and to avoid any consolidation with Enron. Using a total return swap, Enron guaranteed repayment of Citigroup’s $194 million loan,and Fastow orally committed to repurchase Citigroup’s $6 million equity investment. Enron’s bankruptcy examiner concluded that (i) Project Bacchus did not represent a “truesale” of Enron’s pulp and paper trading business, because both Fishtail and Sonomashould have been consolidated with Enron, and (ii) Project Bacchus effectivelyrepresented a $200 million loan from Citigroup to Enron.  Nevertheless, Enron reportedProject Bacchus on its 2000 income statement as generating $200 million in cash flowfrom operations and $112 million in MTM earnings resulting from the “sale” of its pulpand paper trading business.  In addition, Enron did not report its swap obligation to repayCitigroup’s loan as debt on its balance sheet.44Barclays, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), Credit Suisse and RBShelped Enron to make similar fictitious “sales” of assets to off-balance-sheet SPEs. CIBC’s role was particularly significant, as it participated in eleven SPE transactions thatenabled Enron to inflate its reported MTM earnings by nearly $600 million and its
15
reported cash flow by more than $1.7 billion, while understating its reported debt bymore than $1 billion.45  The most notorious of these asset “sales” was Enron’s sale of Nigerian barges toan SPE established by Merrill Lynch at the end of 1999.  Enron needed to sell the bargesto generate earnings but could not find an arms’ length buyer at the desired price.  AtEnron’s request, Merrill Lynch established an SPE to purchase the barges and invested$7 million to capitalize the SPE.  Fastow gave his oral assurance that Enron wouldrepurchase Merrill Lynch’s equity interest within six months and would also give MerrillLynch a 15% return on its investment.  Merrill Lynch’s $7 million investment (togetherwith a $21 million loan from Enron) provided the SPE with funds that were used to buythe Nigerian barges for $28 million. Enron reported the transaction on its 1999 incomestatement as producing $12 million in MTM earnings from the “sale” of the barges, eventhough the transaction did not meet the requirements for a “true sale” to an unaffiliatedparty.  Merrill Lynch also participated in another sham transaction requested by Enron atthe end of 1999 – a pair of offsetting electricity swaps that were effectively “mirrorimages” in their essential terms.  The matched swaps had no substance, but Enron usedthem to report $50 million of additional earnings on its 1999 income statement.46A fourth series of SPE transactions provided accounting hedges for Enron’smerchant investments in speculative, high-technology companies.  These hedgingtransactions had two primary purposes: (i) to lock in gains in the MTM values of some ofEnron’s merchant investments, and (ii) to protect Enron’s balance sheet against futuredeclines in the values of such investments.  To create each of the desired hedges, Enronestablished an SPE in which either LJM1 or LJM2 – purportedly independent
16
partnerships that were controlled by Fastow – held the required three percent equityinterest.  Enron then entered into a total return swap with the SPE.  Under the swap,Enron agreed to pay an amount equal to any increase in the MTM value of the underlyinginvestment and the SPE agreed to pay an amount equal to any decline in the MTM valueof that investment.  Thus, the SPE’s payment obligation under the swap offset any MTMloss that Enron might suffer on the underlying investment.  However, the hedges wereillusory, because Enron capitalized the SPEs with contributions of its own stock.  WhenEnron’s stock price plummeted in 2001, the SPEs could no longer perform their paymentobligations and the hedges collapsed.47Credit Suisse and RBS provided the outside capital for LJM1 and receivedhandsome returns on their investments.  They also participated in transactions involvingLJM1 that enabled Fastow and his associates to reap personal benefits of more than $40million, even though officials at both banks recognized the impropriety of Fastow’s self-dealing.48  Based on LJM1’s success, Fastow persuaded Enron’s board to authorize LJM2– “a big, all-purpose private equity fund” that would enable Enron to “manage itsinvestment portfolio risk, funds flow, and financial flexibility.”49  Fastow chose MerrillLynch to serve as the financial advisor and private placement agent for LJM2.  Fastowinsisted that Enron’s banks must make substantial equity investments in LJM2 if theywanted to maintain “Tier 1” status for Enron’s banking business.  Merrill Lynch and itspartners invested more than $20 million in LJM2, and Enron’s other banks contributed anadditional $80 million.  The banks’ up-front investments enabled Fastow and MerrillLynch to recruit other institutional investors, including insurance companies and pensionfunds.  Fastow and Merrill Lynch ultimately raised $400 million of equity capital for
17
LJM2, which enabled LJM2 to become “the single most powerful tool for managingEnron’s earnings.”50  In addition to the foregoing SPE deals, Enron executed a series of tax-related SPEtransactions that were engineered by Deutsche Bank.  Deutsche’s structured transactionsproduced tax benefits that increased Enron’s reported income by more than $400 millionduring 1997-2001.  Enron’s bankruptcy examiner concluded that these transactions“were, for the most part, artificial transactions lacking a bona fide business purpose otherthan the creation of accounting income for Enron.”51  The Banks’ Awareness of Enron’s Fraud                Enron’s bankruptcy examiner determined that the SPE transactions disguised $14billion of debt obligations by moving those obligations off Enron’s balance sheet.52   Thebanks knew that Enron was using SPE transactions to inflate its reported cash flows andearnings and to hide debt obligations, thereby misleading investors, analysts and creditratings agencies.  Credit Suisse and RBS also recognized that their involvement in LJM1enabled Fastow and his associates to receive improper self-dealing benefits.  Despite thisknowledge, the banks viewed Enron as a highly desirable customer, and they dismissedthe financial and reputational risks created by Enron’s manipulative transactions.    Bank officials plainly recognized the deceptive nature of the structured-financedeals that their banks arranged for Enron.  A Chase officer remarked that “Enron loves[prepay] deals as they are able to hide funded debt from their equity analysts.”53  Similarly, Citibank’s Capital Markets Approval Committee noted that a prepay swaprequested by Enron was “effectively a loan, [but] the form of the transaction would allow[Enron] to reflect it as ‘liabilities from price risk management activity’ on their [sic]
18
balance sheet and also provide a favourable [sic] impact on reported cash flow fromoperations.”54  Officials at Credit Suisse acknowledged that a prepay transaction the bankwas structuring for Enron had “accounting driven” elements, and one officer asked, “Is itOK for us to be entering into such an ‘obvious’ loan transaction?”55               Bank officials also recognized the deceptive impact of Enron’s other SPEtransactions.  A Merrill Lynch officer noted that his firm’s “mirror image” electricityswap with Enron at the end of 1999 “clearly help[ed] them make earnings for the quarterand year (which had a great value in their stock price, not to mention personalcompensation).”56  Several banks understood that Enron was probably violatingaccounting rules when it excluded the assets and liabilities of various SPEs from Enron’sbalance sheet.  As a condition of investing in those SPEs, the banks required Enron’sofficers to give oral assurances that Enron would repurchase the banks’ three percentequity interests.  Given Enron’s assurances, the banks understood that their equityinvestments were not truly “at risk,” a situation that required consolidation of the SPEsonto Enron’s financial statements.57  For example, CIBC officers described their bank’sequity investments in SPEs as “trust me” transactions, because (i)  “[u]nfortunately therecan be no documented means of guaranteeing the equity [investment] … or the saleaccounting treatment is affected,” and (ii) CIBC obtained “the strongest assurance (butnot guarantee) from Enron senior management that we would not incur losses.  Theyhave lived up to their word so far.”58  A Barclays official similarly reported that he hadreceived “explicit verbal support” from Ben Glisan, Enron’s treasurer, who stated that“under all circumstances” Enron would “repay in full” Barclays’ equity investment in theSPE.59   
19
The banks also knew that Enron was structuring deals with SPEs to inflateearnings and hide debt.  A Credit Suisse officer described the Osprey Trust SPEtransaction as “a vehicle enabling Enron to raise disguised debt which appears as equityon Enron’s balance sheet” while “serv[ing] the added purpose for Enron of being an offbalance sheet parking lot for certain assets.”60  RBS officials described Enron’s SPEtransactions as “21st Century Alchemy.”61  Citigroup’s managers referred to ProjectNahanni as “year-end window dressing” and “essentially, an insurance policy for [year-end] balancing.”62  In describing Project Bacchus, a Citigroup officer explained that“Enron’s motivation in the deal now appears to be writing up the asset in question from abasis of about $100MM to as high as $250MM, thereby creating earnings.”63  AnotherCitigroup officer confirmed that “Bacchus is part of a program designed to ensure thatEnron will meet its debt/cap targets.”64  Several bank officials objected to Enron’s SPE deals because of the transactions’deceptive nature and the potential risks they created for the banks.  One Merrill Lynchofficer opposed the Nigerian barge transaction because it would “aid/abet Enron incomestatement manipulation,” and he warned that his firm would face serious “reputationalrisk” if a “credit meltdown” occurred at Enron.65  Similarly, a Citigroup officerquestioned the “appropriateness” of Project Bacchus in view of the “earnings dimensionto this deal.”66  Citigroup’s head of global risk management objected to the SundanceIndustrial transaction, whose purpose was to refinance Project Nahanni, because “[t]heGAAP accounting is aggressive and a franchise risk to us if there is publicity.”67 Similarly, two Credit Suisse officers expressed serious concerns about the “significantreputational risk” created by their bank’s involvement in LJM1, given Fastow’s clear
20
conflicts of interest and the personal benefits Fastow expected to receive from LJM1’sdealings with Enron.68  In each case, however, the banks went forward with the deals because theywanted to maintain their lucrative relationships with Enron.  A Merrill Lynch officerdefended the Nigerian barge deal by arguing that the deal would “differentiate [MerrillLynch] from the pack and add significant value.”69  A Citigroup officer highlighted theimportance of Project Bacchus by explaining that “[f]or Enron, this transaction is‘mission critical’ (their label not mine) for [year-end 2000] and a ‘must’ for us.”70  AfterProject Bacchus was approved, a Citigroup officer remarked, “Sounds like we made a lotof exceptions to our standard policies.  I am sure we have gone out of our way to let themknow that we are bending over backwards for them . . . let’s remember to collect this iouwhen it really counts.”71  Credit Suisse decided to invest in LJM1 because Skilling told aCredit Suisse officer that the LJM1/Rhythms transaction was very important to Enron,and because Credit Suisse wanted to strengthen its relationship with Enron and Fastow. After completing a refinancing of LJM1 that resulted in significantly higher payments toCredit Suisse, RBS and Fastow, a Credit Suisse banker explained that that the refinancing“has provided a significant return to [Credit Suisse] and has further enhanced ourrelationship with Andrew Fastow.”  The banker’s supervisor praised her for doing “anexcellent job.”72In fact, Enron’s banks had powerful financial incentives to satisfy Enron’sdemands.  During 1997-2001, Enron’s top banks received the following fees from Enron:Citigroup – $188 million; Credit Suisse – $94 million; Chase – $86 million; Deutsche – $72 million; Merrill Lynch – $63 million; RBS – $60 million; and CIBC – $30 million.73 
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Not surprisingly, the banks prized their relationships with Enron.  Citigroup rankedEnron as “one of the highest revenue clients within Citigroup,” Chase described Enron as“our single largest client,” RBS lauded Enron as one of its “most remunerative clients,”and Credit Suisse viewed Enron as “a Firm wide … priority”74  Perhaps the mostrevealing comment appeared in a CIBC internal memorandum, which explained thatEnron’s SPE transactions were “[n]ot terribly popular with [CIBC’s] risk management[group], but the returns changed their minds!”75    The Banks’ Failure to Protect Enron’s InvestorsIn addition to their roles in Enron’s SPE transactions, universal banks served asunderwriters or private placement agents for many public offerings and privateplacements of debt and equity securities by Enron and its affiliates.  Citigroup, MerrillLynch and Credit Suisse each participated in more than twenty public and privateofferings of Enron-related securities.76  During 1998-2001, those three banks, along withChase, CIBC, Barclays, Lehman Brothers and Bank of America, underwrote offerings forseveral billions of dollars of Enron-related securities.77  After Enron collapsed, investorsfiled a class action lawsuit, which alleged that the banks failed to satisfy their duties asunderwriters under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act).  The lawsuitcharged that the banks did not exercise due diligence and, as a consequence, the offeringmaterials failed to disclose Enron’s business and financial problems and its deceptiveaccounting.78  In addition, the lawsuit claimed that the banks were liable for securitiesfraud under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), becausethey knowingly or recklessly distributed misleading offering materials and participated inother fraudulent practices (including the SPE transactions).79
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The class action plaintiffs further alleged that the banks committed securitiesfraud by causing their investment analysts to issue highly favorable research reportsabout Enron despite the banks’ knowledge of Enron’s growing problems.80  By 1999,Enron’s banks were aware of Enron’s difficulties in generating operating revenues tomatch its reported MTM earnings, and the banks also knew that Enron was executingdozens of accounting-driven SPE transactions that generated large off-balance-sheetliabilities.  By 2001, Enron’s banks recognized that the company was heavily leveraged,had significant liquidity problems and depended on a continuous stream of newfinancings.  During this period, several of the banks quietly reduced their creditexposures to Enron by entering into credit default swaps, surety agreements and otherhedging transactions.81Despite the banks’ awareness of Enron’s increasingly severe problems, theirinvestment analysts continued to publish favorable reports about Enron until shortlybefore Enron’s collapse.  In October 2001, “all sixteen investment analysts tracked byThomson Financial/First Call rated Enron a ‘buy,’ and thirteen called it a ‘strong buy,’”notwithstanding a fifty percent decline in Enron’s stock price and the publication ofarticles in the financial press that questioned the validity of Enron’s financialstatements.82  In November 2001, “eleven of the thirteen analysts following Enron stillrecommended that the public purchase the stock, and only one recommended selling it,”even though Enron had disclosed a $1.2 billion writedown in its assets as well as an SECinvestigation into its accounting practices,83  The only analyst with a “sell”recommendation in November 2001 was employed by Prudential Securities, which didnot engage in investment banking activities.84  
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Indeed, universal banks placed great pressure on their investment analysts to issueonly favorable comments about Enron.  Merrill Lynch and Citigroup fired analysts whopublished critical reports about Enron during the late 1990s.  Merrill Lynch andCitigroup discharged their analysts after Enron’s senior management complained abouttheir reports and warned that the analysts were undermining the banks’ relationships withEnron.85  BNP Paribas allegedly forced an analyst to resign after he (i) published aresearch report downgrading Enron to “neutral” in August 2001, and (ii) told his clientsthat Enron’s securities “should be sold at all costs and sold now.”86  Also in August 2001,UBS fired a broker, Chung Wu, after he advised a number of clients – who were alsoEnron employees – that Enron’s financial situation was “deteriorating” and they should“take some money off the table.”  After receiving a strongly-worded complaint fromEnron, UBS terminated Wu and apologized to Enron.  UBS also sent a message to Wu’sclients to assure them that Enron was “likely heading higher than lower from here onout.”  UBS’ message included a copy of UBS’ most recent research report on Enron,which included a “strong buy” rating and said that “[w]e would be aggressive buyers ofEnron at current levels.”  Like Merrill Lynch and Citigroup, UBS wanted to preserve itsrelationship with Enron, which included investment banking work and a lucrativeappointment as administrator of Enron’s employee stock option plan.87 Credit Suisse’s research analysts faced similar conflicts of interest with respect toEnron.  Two Credit Suisse analysts warned a Chase analyst to stay away from Enron’sstock in October 2001, at a time when Credit Suisse’s research department maintained a“strong buy” rating on Enron.  In response, the Chase analyst questioned why “you’retelling me one thing but [your] clients a different story??? A little shady if you ask me….
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[A]fraid to lose the banking business??? [A]re you an investment banker or equityresearch analyst???”88  In a subsequent email message to his colleague, one of the CreditSuisse analysts admitted that “[w]e were [Enron’s] number 1 supporter so the threat of adamaging research note was zero.  [T]hey needed us to publicly sell the stock almost asmuch as we needed them for the fees.”89   Credit Suisse’s senior managers and investment bankers pressured anotheranalyst, Jill Sakol, not to publish critical reports about Enron in 2001.90  At the sametime, the head of Credit Suisse’s research department praised Sakol for communicatingher negative assessment of Enron to Credit Suisse’s bond traders, who quickly sold offthe bank’s position in debt securities issued by an Enron SPE.91  Thus, Credit Suisse, likeother universal banks, quietly reduced its credit exposure to Enron while subordinatingthe interests of retail investors to the bank’s own interest in maintaining its relationshipwith Enron.  The Banks’ Losses from the Enron DebacleEnron proved to be a very costly client for its banks.  By September 2006,universal banks had paid more than $8 billion, and had surrendered about $3 billion oftheir creditor claims against Enron, in order to settle various claims asserted by the SEC,Enron’s investors, and Enron itself.  Those amounts will almost certainly increase asEnron’s investors and Enron itself continue to pursue their claims against non-settlingbanks. Citigroup, Chase, CIBC and Merrill Lynch paid nearly $400 million to settleEnron-related charges filed against them by the SEC.92  Citigroup, Chase, CIBC, LehmanBrothers and Bank of America paid $6.9 billion to settle claims asserted against them in a
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class action lawsuit by Enron investors.93  In September 2006, Fastow stated at hissentencing hearing that he would provide evidence to help Enron’s investors litigate theirclass action claims against non-settling banks, including Credit Suisse, Deutsche, MerrillLynch, Royal Bank of Canada (“RBC”), RBS and Toronto Dominion.94  In addition,Bank of America, Barclays, Chase, CIBC, Merrill Lynch, RBC, RBS, and TorontoDominion paid Enron $900 million and surrendered creditor claims worth about $3billion, in order to settle claims filed by Enron itself.  As of November 2006, Enron wasstill pursuing claims against Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche and Merrill Lynch.95 UNIVERSAL BANKS AND WORLDCOMThe Rise and Fall of WorldComThe chronicle of WorldCom’s rapid ascent and sudden collapse resemblesEnron’s story in a number of respects.  Like Enron, WorldCom grew from humblebeginnings to become a leading “New Economy” firm and a favorite of institutionalinvestors during the late 1990s.  Like Enron’s officials, WorldCom’s managers sought topump up their company’s stock price by promising to meet aggressive earnings targetsset by Wall Street analysts.  Like Enron, WorldCom depended on universal banks toarrange the financing the company needed for its rapid expansion.  Like Enron,WorldCom resorted to accounting fraud when it could not produce the revenues andearnings it promised to Wall Street.96  Finally, the top managers of WorldCom – likethose of Enron – were unrelenting in their drive to achieve dominance in their industry. For a time, Wall Street analysts and institutional investors had complete confidence inthe ability of WorldCom’s managers to achieve their ambitious goals.  Bernie Ebbers andScott Sullivan (WorldCom’s CEO and CFO) “were considered one of the best pairings in
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American business in the late 1990s as WorldCom’s stock soared, often finishing eachother’s sentences when talking to adoring Wall Street analysts.”97  At the end of 2001,institutional investors owned 56.5% of WorldCom’s stock (just as institutional investorshad owned about 60% of Enron’s stock at the end of 2000).98  WorldCom and its predecessor, Long Distance Discount Services, Inc. (“LDDS”),aggressively pursued business opportunities created by the deregulation of thetelecommunications (telecom) industry following the breakup of AT&T’s telephonemonopoly in 1984.  LDDS began operating in 1983 as a small provider of discount long-distance telephone services to Mississippi customers.  In 1985, LDDS hired BernieEbbers as its CEO.  Ebbers was a former high school basketball coach who owned achain of motels.  He had no prior experience in the telecom business, but he hadunlimited ambition and “unshakeable optimism.”99  Between 1985 and 2001, LDDS (renamed WorldCom in 1995) acquired morethan seventy companies for total consideration valued at more than $100 billion.  By2001, WorldCom was the second largest long-distance telephone company and thelargest provider of Internet-based communications services in the United States.100  Therapid growth of LDDS and WorldCom occurred in several stages.  First, LDDS andWorldCom acquired a series of domestic and international providers of long-distancetelephone services to exploit the deregulation of the long-distance market that began in1984.  Second, WorldCom entered the local telephone business shortly after theTelecommunications Act of 1996 removed legal barriers that had previously barred long-distance carriers from offering local calling services.  In December 1996, WorldComacquired MFS Communications, thereby securing access to local telephone networks in a
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number of major U.S. and European metropolitan markets.  In addition, by acquiringUUNet, a subsidiary of MFS, WorldCom gained the ability to offer Internetcommunications services.  Third, WorldCom cemented its status as a leading competitorin markets for local, long-distance and international communications when it acquiredMCI Communications in 1998.  Fourth, WorldCom significantly expanded its wirelesscommunications business by purchasing Skytel Communications and two other wirelessproviders in 1999.  WorldCom then agreed to a merger with Sprint, which would havecreated the largest telecom firm in the United States.  However, WorldCom was forced toabandon the Sprint transaction in July 2000, after the U.S. Justice Department and theEuropean Union opposed the deal on antitrust grounds.  WorldCom’s last majoracquisition occurred in September 2000, when it agreed to purchase Intermedia,primarily for the purpose of acquiring the web hosting business operated by Digex (asubsidiary of Intermedia).101    WorldCom invested massive amounts in an effort to create a global network offiber-optic cables, telephone lines and wireless facilities that could offer a full range oftelecom, video and Internet services to commercial and residential customers.  Inaddition to installing its own network of lines, WorldCom entered into long-term leasesto use the lines of other telecom firms.  Many of those leases required WorldCom tomake fixed monthly payments regardless of whether WorldCom or its customers actuallyused the leased lines.  By 2000, line costs were WorldCom’s largest expense item andrepresented about half of its operating costs.102  At its peak in mid-1999, WorldCom had a market capitalization of $180 billion. WorldCom’s reported revenues reached $39 billion in 2000, based on operations in 65
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nations.103  WorldCom’s growth strategy depended on continuous increases in its stockprice, which it used as currency to pay for acquiring other companies.  Wall Streetanalysts and institutional investors supported a high stock price for WorldCom as long asits reported revenues grew at an annual rate of 12-15%.  Through the first quarter of2000, WorldCom met Wall Street’s expectations.  WorldCom inflated its reportedrevenues and earnings by drawing down accounting reserves, including reserves forestimated merger expenses that WorldCom had established when it acquired othercompanies.  Analysts and investors had not questioned WorldCom’s establishment oflarge reserves to cover merger-related costs, and WorldCom drew upon those reserves toboost its revenues and profits.104The collapse of the Sprint merger in 2000 deprived WorldCom of a major sourceof additional revenues and also prevented it from creating new reserves for merger costs. Moreover, conditions in the telecom business became intensely competitive andWorldCom’s profits fell sharply after 1999.  Like WorldCom, thousands of firms hadentered domestic and foreign markets for local, long-distance, Internet and wirelesscommunications services during the 1990s.  By 2000, the telecom industry was plaguedby overinvestment, heavy debt burdens and excess capacity.  Compounding theseproblems, the collapse of many “dot com” firms in 2000 caused a sharp decline in thedemand for communications services.105  Because of these adverse developments,WorldCom’s operating revenues declined after the fourth quarter of 1999.  From late1999 through early.2001, Sullivan (with Ebbers’ knowledge) instructed WorldCom’saccounting staff to use at least $3.3 billion in reserves to absorb line costs and increaseWorldCom’s reported earnings, in violation of generally accepted accounting principles
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(“GAAP”).  After WorldCom exhausted its available reserves in early 2001, Sullivan(again with Ebbers’ knowledge) directed WorldCom’s accounting staff to capitalize $3.8billion of WorldCom’s line costs during 2001 and the first quarter of 2002.  Sullivan’scapitalization of line costs reduced WorldCom’s reported expenses and boosted itsreported profits, once again in clear violation of GAAP.106  According to Sullivan’s testimony at Ebbers’ criminal trial, Ebbers repeatedlytold Sullivan during 2000-02 that “[w]e have to hit our numbers.”  At the same time,Ebbers assured the public that WorldCom was achieving “very solid growth” and “therewere no storms on the horizon.”  In February 2002, Ebbers declared during a conferencecall with investors and analysts that “[w]e stand by our accounting” and “[t]o questionWorldCom’s viability is utter nonsense.”107  Ebbers resigned as CEO at the end of April2002.  Less than two months later, WorldCom’s internal auditors discovered Sullivan’sillegal capitalization of line costs.  On June 25, 2002, WorldCom’s board of directorsfired Sullivan and publicly announced a restatement that reduced its previously reportedearnings by $3.8 billion.  As was true at Enron, WorldCom’s disclosure of its accountingviolations triggered a rapid collapse of confidence among its investors and creditors.  OnJuly 21, 2002, WorldCom filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization.108At the time of its bankruptcy filing, WorldCom reported assets of $107 billionand debts of $41 billion.  However, about half of WorldCom’s reported assets consistedof goodwill, representing the premium above fair market value that WorldCom had paidwhen it acquired other companies.109  In 2004, WorldCom (renamed MCI) issued a finalrestatement that reduced its previously-reported pretax earnings by $74.4 billion.  Of thatamount, MCI allocated $10.6 billion to accounting fraud and attributed most of the
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remainder to the decline in value of MCI’s goodwill.110  Less than two years later,Verizon acquired MCI’s remaining assets for only $8.5 billion.111The Banks’ Involvement in the WorldCom DebacleAs described in the previous section, WorldCom’s managers accomplished theirfraud primarily by manipulating accounting entries.  James Fanto has pointed out thatWorldCom’s fraud was different from Enron’s deceptions, because WorldCom’smanagers did not use “SPEs and structured finance, which demand intensive investmentbanking involvement.”112  Consequently, universal banks did not have the same degree ofdirect involvement in WorldCom’s fraud as they did with Enron’s abuses.  Nevertheless,in at least two ways, banks played a “significant” role in the WorldCom disaster.113  First,they actively promoted WorldCom’s aggressive and ultimately fatal growth strategy bypersuading investors to purchase WorldCom’s securities, by providing large loans toWorldCom, and by issuing analysts’ reports with glowing evaluations of WorldCom’sfuture prospects.  Second, at least three banks – Citigroup, Bank of America and Chase –participated in the corruption of WorldCom’s management by providing Ebbers withextraordinary financial benefits in order to win WorldCom’s business.             Universal banks underwrote huge public and private offerings of debt and equitysecurities by WorldCom.  Citigroup and its predecessors were sole lead managers forpublic offerings of more than $8 billion of WorldCom debt securities in 1997 and 1998. Citigroup and Chase jointly led two public offerings of WorldCom bonds – the first for$5 billion in 2000, and the second for $11.9 billion in 2001.  Chase acted as sole leadmanager for a $2 billion private offering of WorldCom notes in 2000.114  Both Citigroupand Chase were also directly involved in offerings of WorldCom stock.  Citigroup was
31
the principal financial advisor for WorldCom’s acquisitions of MFS and MCI, resultingin the issuance of more than $50 billion of WorldCom stock to the shareholders of MFSand MCI.  Chase was the principal financial advisor for WorldCom’s acquisition ofIntermedia, resulting in the issuance of $5.8 billion of WorldCom stock to Intermedia’sshareholders.115  Bank of America acted as lead arranger for a $10.75 billion syndicatedloan in 2000, and it was also one of five arrangers for a $2 billion trade receivablesecuritization program.  Bank of America also participated in WorldCom’s public bondofferings in 1998, 2000 and 2001.116 Events in 2001 confirmed the close connection between the underwriting andlending activities of WorldCom’s banks.  In March 2001, WorldCom asked its banks fora syndicated loan for up to $10 billion in order to refinance its existing bank debt. WorldCom told its leading banks – including Citigroup, Chase and Bank of America –that they must each provide at least $800 million of the new syndicated loan in order tosecure roles as lead underwriters for WorldCom’s planned $11.9 billion bond offering inMay 2001.  The banks agreed to provide the requested loan, even though they hadincreasing doubts about WorldCom’s financial strength.117  As discussed below, some ofthe banks quietly reduced their lending exposures to WorldCom but none of themdisclosed their doubts to public investors.  Bank of America, Chase and Citigroup also provided extensive personal benefitsto Ebbers to solidify their positions as WorldCom’s leading bankers.  Bank of Americaprovided Ebbers with $200 million of personal loans that were secured by his WorldComstock.  Ebbers used those loans (together with more than $100 million of loans fromother banks and securities brokers) to purchase a large ranch in Canada, a shipyard and
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yacht building business in Georgia, a trucking company, and 600,000 acres of timberlandin Alabama and Mississippi.  Ebbers’ relationship with Bank of America becameseverely strained, however, when WorldCom’s stock price declined sharply during 2000and 2001.  The fall in WorldCom’s stock price triggered repeated margin calls on Ebbersby Bank of America.  WorldCom ultimately agreed to repay all of Ebbers’ loans fromBank of America in order to avoid a massive sale of WorldCom stock by the bank.118In April 2001, Chase gave Ebbers a $20 million line of credit, even though Chaseknew that Ebbers already had more than $300 million in outstanding personal loanssecured by his WorldCom stock.  Investment bankers at Chase urged their personalbanking colleagues to approve the loan in order to strengthen Chase’s relationship withEbbers and WorldCom.119Citigroup and its predecessors, Salomon Brothers and SSB, provided the mostextraordinary favors to Ebbers.  In June 1996, at a time when Salomon was seeking toestablish an investment banking relationship with WorldCom, Salomon allocated toEbbers 200,000 shares of an IPO made by McLeod Inc., a Salomon underwriting client. Salomon’s allocation of McLeod stock to Ebbers was more than four times larger thanany other allocation made to a retail customer.  Two months after the McLeod IPO,WorldCom retained Salomon as its financial advisor for the acquisition of MFS.  From1996 through 2002, WorldCom paid Salomon/SSB and Citigroup more than $140 millionof fees, including $107 million for services provided in connection with nine majortransactions.  During the same period, Salomon and Citigroup allocated stock to Ebbersin twenty-two IPOs or secondary offerings made by underwriting clients.  Ebbers earnedtrading profits of $12.8 million from those allocations (including $2.16 million from the
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McLeod IPO).  WorldCom’s bankruptcy examiner concluded that these allocations “wereintended to and did influence Mr. Ebbers to award WorldCom investment bankingbusiness to Salomon/SSB. . . . Salomon/SSB came to be WorldCom’s preferredinvestment banker on both acquisition and financings.”120  SSB continued to provide IPO allocations to Ebbers after Travelers (SSB’s parentcompany) acquired Salomon in 1997, even though SSB had adopted a policy thatprohibited “spinning.”  SSB’s anti-spinning policy declared that “shares may not beallocated to an executive of a corporate client or prospect as a quid pro quo for receivinginvestment banking or other business from his or her corporate employer.”  SSBapparently disregarded its policy and continued to give allocations to Ebbers becauseWorldCom was one of SSB’s premier clients.  In April 2003, Citigroup consented to theentry of an SEC order declaring that Salomon/SSB’s allocations of IPO shares to Ebbersconstituted unlawful spinning in violation of rules of the National Association ofSecurities Dealers and the New York Stock Exchange.121       Citigroup also provided huge loans to Ebbers.  In 1999, Citigroup lent $63 millionto Ebbers to refinance the loan on his Canadian ranch.122  In February 2000, Travelerssyndicated a $499 million loan to Joshua Timberland, a company controlled by Ebbers.123 In October 2000, Ebbers asked Citigroup for additional credit.  After an extensive review,Citigroup’s senior management approved an additional personal loan in light of the “highprofile/quality of Ebbers as a Citigroup client, both individually and as CEO ofWorldCom.”  Citigroup lent Ebbers $53 million, including a refinancing of his existingloan balance of $41.7 million.124  Citigroup had good reasons to accommodate Ebbersbecause (i) Citigroup knew that Ebbers resented Bank of America’s margin calls, and
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Citigroup wanted to replace Bank of America as the leading provider of corporatebanking services to WorldCom, and (ii) Citigroup was concerned that WorldCom wasdeveloping a strong investment banking relationship with Chase.  In November 2000,despite the continuing decline in WorldCom’s stock price, Citigroup decided not to makea margin call on Ebbers, given “the strength of the corporate finance relationshipbetween SSB and WorldCom.”  Citigroup did not make any margin calls on Ebbers untilMay 3, 2002, four days after he resigned as WorldCom’s CEO.125  WorldCom’sbankruptcy examiner concluded that Citigroup’s loans to Ebbers “constituted anotherform of ‘spinning,’ a means of obtaining and/or keeping corporate business as a result ofpersonal financial favors provided to corporate executives.”126           The Bank Underwriters’ Failure to Protect WorldCom’s InvestorsIn February 2001, Bank of America, Chase and Deutsche each downgradedWorldCom in their confidential internal credit ratings.  The banks reduced their internalcredit ratings for WorldCom due to concerns about the company’s rapidly increasingdebt, its lack of revenue growth, competitive pressures on its long-distance business, andits lack of a strategic plan after abandoning the proposed merger with Sprint.127  Inaddition, Bank of America and Chase reduced their lending exposures to WorldCom byentering into credit default swaps and other hedging transactions, but both banks did soquietly in order to avoid offending WorldCom.128  Notwithstanding their growingconcerns about WorldCom, all three banks acted as underwriters for WorldCom’s $11.9billion public offering of bonds in May 2001.  Chase acted as a joint lead manager for thebond offering along with Citigroup, and both banks participated in a “road show” inAmerica and Europe to promote the sale of the bonds.  The road show script stated that
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“[w]e are excited about the WorldCom credit story and this debt offering. . . .WorldCom’s financial position gives it the strongest credit profile of any of the largestbroadband providers.”129  The offering prospectus and road show script for the 2001 bond offering did notdisclose that any of the bank underwriters had previously downgraded WorldCom in theirinternal credit ratings or had reduced their credit exposures to WorldCom throughhedging transactions.  The prospectuses for the 2000 and 2001 bond offerings also didnot contain a “risk factors” section describing the specific investment risks associatedwith the bonds.  In August 2002, bond purchasers filed a class action lawsuit against theseventeen bank underwriters, alleging that the underwriters failed to exercise duediligence to ensure that the prospectus for each offering disclosed all material factsconcerning the bonds’ investment risks.  The purchasers alleged that the underwritersknew sufficient facts to put them on notice that WorldCom’s financial statements for1999 and 2000 were materially misleading, particularly with respect to the treatment ofline costs as capital expenditures rather than operating expenses.  The purchasers alsocharged that the underwriters should have known that the bond offering prospectusesomitted many other material facts, including (i) the lack of specific disclosure of the “riskfactors” associated with the bonds, including the deterioration of WorldCom’s long-distance business, (ii) the omission of information concerning the loans and IPOallocations Ebbers received from bank underwriters, and (iii) the absence of anyinformation about the underwriters’ actions in reducing their internal credit ratings andhedging their credit exposures during early 2001.130   A federal district court ruled in2004 that federal law did not explicitly require the underwriters to disclose their internal
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credit ratings or hedging activities with regard to WorldCom.  However, the court heldthat the underwriters’ actions (which indicated their concerns about WorldCom) and theother omissions cited above raised legitimate issues to be resolved at trial as to whetherthe underwriters failed to satisfy their duties of due diligence and reasonable care underSections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act.131 The conflicts of interest faced by the bank underwriters were further reflected inDeutsche’s conduct shortly before WorldCom collapsed.  On April 12, 2002, JohnTierney, Deutsche’s head of credit derivatives strategy, published a note stating thatWorldCom was headed for bankruptcy or an involuntary merger.  Tierney also warnedthat “recovery values for a WorldCom bankruptcy could be quite low, less than 30percent.”  Five days later, Deutsche retracted Tierney’s note and claimed that it had beenissued by mistake.132  As discussed below, the bank underwriters eventually settled theclaims filed against them by the bond purchasers, and Chase, Bank of America andDeutsche paid the largest amounts with the exception of Citigroup.Citigroup’s Disregard for Investors’ InterestsCitigroup undoubtedly played the most significant role in encouraging investorsto buy WorldCom’s securities.  The class action filed by purchasers of WorldCom’sbonds and stock alleged that Citigroup violated its duty as an underwriter under the 1933Act and also committed securities fraud under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.  Thepurchasers’ allegation of securities fraud presented two major claims.  First, thepurchasers maintained that Citigroup and Jack Grubman (its leading telecom analyst)established “an illicit quid pro quo arrangement” with WorldCom’s senior managementand had actual knowledge about material misstatements and omissions contained in the
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bond offering prospectuses.  Second, the purchasers charged that Grubman andCitigroup’s research department knowingly issued misleading reports to investors “thattouted WorldCom’s value and vigorously encouraged investors” to buy WorldCom’ssecurities, even though Citigroup knew that “the integrity and objectivity of its researchdepartment was compromised by the department’s decision to serve the needs of thefirm’s investment bankers at the expense of providing investors with independentanalysis.”133  As discussed below, Citigroup was the first bank underwriter to settle thepurchasers’ claims, and it paid the largest amount of any settling bank.  Grubman developed a close personal relationship with WorldCom’s seniormanagement and became a principal advisor to Ebbers and WorldCom’s board.  After hejoined Salomon in 1994, Grubman coordinated Salomon’s efforts to attract WorldCom asa client.  As noted above, Salomon became WorldCom’s primary investment bank after itprovided an exceptionally generous allocation to Ebbers in the McLeod IPO and alsohelped to arrange WorldCom’s acquisition of MFS (a Salomon client).134  Grubmanattended at least four WorldCom board meetings and advised WorldCom’s directors onmajor transactions, including the merger with MCI in late 1997 and the attempted mergerwith Sprint in late 1999.  Grubman also advised WorldCom’s managers as to how theyshould respond to press reports about WorldCom and how they should answer anticipatedquestions during conference calls with investors and analysts.  WorldCom’s boardminutes described Grubman as a “financial advisor” to the company, despite his officialposition as an investment analyst.135Grubman saw no conflict between his status as an investment analyst and his roleas a key business advisor to Ebbers and other CEOs of telecom firms.  Nor did Grubman
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see any problem with his active role in helping Citigroup to arrange investment bankingtransactions for his clients.  Grubman claimed credit for helping to generate over $600million in investment banking revenues for Citigroup in 2000, and he asked Citigroup’sinvestment banking department to reimburse his expenses for attending Ebbers’wedding.136  In a May 2000 interview, Grubman proclaimed, “I’m sculpting the industry.. . . I get feedback from institutions and CEOs.  It feeds on itself.  It’s a virtuous circle.” Grubman dismissed critics who claimed that his close ties with telecom executivescompromised his objectivity.  Grubman declared, “What used to be a conflict is now asynergy . . . . [Institutional investors] know that I’m in the flow of what’s going on. . . .Objective?  The other word for that is uninformed.”137 WorldCom’s growth strategy dovetailed perfectly with Grubman’s vision of thetelecom industry’s future.  Grubman maintained that telecom firms must build broadbandnetworks that would transmit a full range of voice, video and Internet services.  Heargued that “the demand for bandwidth is basically insatiable” because telecom serviceswere becoming “part of the Web-centric society.”  Thus, in Grubman’s view, the long-term survivors in the telecom industry would be firms that pursued an aggressive strategy“to marry [bandwidth] networks and customers.”138  His prediction of an inexhaustibledemand for bandwidth was consistent with WorldCom’s repeated claims that Internettraffic was doubling every 100 days.139  His clients and other telecom firms rushed tobuild national and global fiber-optic networks, and the amount of installed fiber increasedfivefold between 1998 and 2001.140    Grubman’s status as the “king of telecom” helped Citigroup to become the topunderwriter for telecom firms.  During 1996-2002, Citigroup earned $1.2 billion in fees
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from telecom firms and underwrote $190 billion of their debt and equity securities,representing a quarter of all issuances of telecom stocks and bonds during that period.141 Citigroup rewarded Grubman by paying him $67.5 million between 1999 and 2002.142  InMay 2000, Eduardo Mestre, Citigroup’s co-head of investment banking, commented thatGrubman “has had a thesis for creating value in the telecom sector that’s been dead right:Build it and they will come. . . . It wasn’t a foregone conclusion that the thesis would becorrect.”143     Mestre’s comment soon proved to be cruelly ironic. By 2002, analysts denouncedGrubman’s vision of telecom’s future as “wildly hyped.”144  Instead of doubling every100 days, Internet traffic doubled only every year.  Meanwhile, technological advancesincreased the data transmission capacity of fiber-optic lines by up to 1,000 times between1995 and 2002.  Consequently, the frenzied installation of broadband networks byGrubman’s clients and their rivals produced a massive glut of transmission capacity.  BySeptember 2002, only about three percent of installed bandwidth capacity was beingused, and many of Grubman’s leading clients – including WorldCom, Global Crossing,McLeodUSA, Metromedia Fiber Networks, Rhythms Netconnections, Winstar and XOCommunications – had filed for bankruptcy.145 Grubman’s research reports promoted WorldCom more than any other firm.  Hisreports described WorldCom as “our favorite stock” in August 1997 and as a “must-own”stock in November 1998.  He urged investors to “load up the truck” with WorldComstock in August 1999.146  In response to the severe decline in WorldCom’s stock priceduring 2000-01, Grubman argued that WorldCom’s critics were mistaken, and heencouraged investors to take advantage of the company’s “dirt cheap” stock price.147  He
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maintained the highest “buy” rating on WorldCom’s stock from January 1997 throughApril 2002.  On February 4, 2002, Grubman published a research note in which hecontended that WorldCom’s stock price “has been unduly punished by a multitude offactors . . . [and] has more than corrected for any actual impacts from those issues. Therefore, we believe that [WorldCom] at this point represents a very compelling valueproposition for a telecom company.”148  Also in February 2002, Grubman supportedWorldCom’s projection that it would generate positive free cash flow during the secondquarter of 2002.149  Grubman did not reduce his rating on WorldCom to “neutral” until April 21,2002, eight days before Ebbers resigned as CEO.  He did not downgrade WorldCom to“underperform” (sell) until June 21, 2002, a month before WorldCom filed forbankruptcy.150  Of course, Grubman was hardly alone in giving WorldCom strong “buy”ratings during 2000-02.  Many analysts (including those employed by three major WallStreet brokerage firms) maintained such ratings on WorldCom at the end of 2001. However, other analysts disagreed with Grubman.  Analysts at Wachovia Securities andBlueStone Capital (an independent research firm) posted neutral ratings on WorldCombeginning in March 2001.  Analysts at Credit Suisse and Morgan Stanley also issuedneutral ratings before the end of 2001.151  Grubman’s consistently bullish investment ratings were matched by his unusuallyaggressive target prices for WorldCom’s stock.  From February 1997 through January2002, Grubman established target prices for WorldCom’s stock that were (with fewexceptions) the highest quoted by any analyst.  During that period, virtually all of
41
Grubman’s target prices were at least 50% above WorldCom’s actual stock price, andmany of his target prices were 100% or more above the actual stock price.152During an appearance before a congressional committee on July 8, 2002,Grubman testified that he did not know about any fraudulent accounting at WorldComuntil it was disclosed by the company two weeks earlier.  Grubman declared that“WorldCom is a company I believed in wholeheartedly for a long time” and “[a]ll mybeliefs have been honestly held.”153  He also stated that he was “sorry to see investorssuffer losses” based on his faulty analysis of the telecom industry, and he denied that hisanalysis was motivated by conflicts of interest.154  Similarly, in his letter of resignation toCitigroup in August 2002, Grubman apologized for “failing to predict” the telecomindustry’s collapse, but he again insisted, “I always wrote what I believed and based myopinions on a long and sincerely held investment thesis.”155Despite his protestations of honesty and good faith, Grubman consented to theSEC’s entry of an order on April 28, 2003, finding that (i) Grubman published fraudulentresearch reports in 2001 on two telecom firms (Focal Communications and MetromediaFiber), and (ii) Grubman wanted to downgrade Focal and five other telecom providers inApril 2001, but he refrained from doing so because of pressure applied by Citigroup’sinvestment bankers.  In addition, the SEC charged that Grubman raised his rating onAT&T’s stock from neutral to strong buy in November 1999, at the urging of Citigroup’sco-CEO, Sanford (Sandy) Weill.  Weill asked Grubman take a “fresh look” at AT&T inorder to help Citigroup win an underwriting mandate for AT&T’s planned offering of awireless tracking stock.  In return, Grubman asked Weill to help persuade the 92nd StreetY’s highly selective preschool to admit Grubman’s children.  Grubman’s upgrade of
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AT&T’s stock was a crucial factor in persuading AT&T to appoint Citigroup as leadunderwriter for its $10.6 billion offering of wireless tracking stock.  Grubman’s childrenwere admitted to the Y’s preschool after Weill spoke to a member of the Y’s board andarranged for the Citigroup Foundation to make a $1 million donation to the Y.156  The SEC quoted internal emails sent by Grubman to colleagues in which (1) hecalled Focal a “pig,” (2) he acknowledged that “most of our banking clients are going tozero and you know I wanted to downgrade them months ago but got huge pushback frombanking,” and (3) he admitted that he “upgraded [AT&T] to get . . . Sandy to get my kidsinto 92nd St Y pre-school (which is harder than Harvard),” and he subsequently “wentback to my normal negative self on [AT&T].”157  While Grubman did not admit or denythe SEC’s allegations, he paid a $15 million penalty and consented to a lifetime ban fromthe securities industry.158  On the same date that Grubman settled with the SEC, Citigroup paid a $400million penalty and consented to the entry of an SEC enforcement order.  The SECcharged that (i) Citigroup encouraged Grubman and other investment analysts to supportCitigroup’s investment banking activities and allowed Grubman and other analysts toissue false and misleading reports to investors about several telecom firms, and (ii)Citigroup approved unlawful “spinning” of IPO allocations to Ebbers and otherexecutives of existing or potential clients for the purpose of attracting additionalinvestment banking business.159  In May 2004, Citigroup agreed to pay $2.6 billion tosettle the WorldCom investors’ class action soon after the investors’ counsel filed a courtbrief, which cited evidence indicating that “the ‘most senior officers of Salomon’acknowledged privately that its investment bankers had pressured its analysts to avoid
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negative ratings and that ‘providing accurate stock ratings conflicted with Salomon’sparamount goals of securing investment banking business.’”160            The SEC’s complaints against Grubman and Citigroup did not allege thatGrubman issued false research reports with respect to WorldCom.  However, the SEC’scharges seriously undermined Grubman’s claims of objectivity and honesty.  Moreover,the WorldCom investors’ class action alleged that, in early 2000, Grubman began to use a“cash earnings” model for WorldCom’s operating results that departed from his previous“discounted cash flow” model.  The investors charged that Grubman’s new model –which he did not use for any other telecom firm – omitted capital expenditures, a centralcomponent of WorldCom’s fraud.  A federal district court denied motions by Citigroupand Grubman to dismiss the investors’ complaint, finding that the complaint “describesstrong circumstantial evidence that Grubman learned of at least the capital expenditurefraud.”161  The Banks’ Losses from the WorldCom DisasterLike Enron, WorldCom proved to be an extremely costly client.  Seventeen banksthat served as underwriters for WorldCom paid more than $6 billion to settle theWorldCom investors’ class action, with the largest amounts being paid by Citigroup($2.6 billion), Chase ($2 billion), Bank of America ($460 million), and Deutsche ($325million).162  The same group of banks paid over $600 million to settle additional lawsuitsfiled by institutional investors who did not participate in the class action.163  Inannouncing Citigroup’s decision to settle the class action, chairman Charles Princedenied that his bank had violated any laws and said that it had chosen to buy an“insurance policy . . . against a roll of a dice in front of a jury . . . [on] a $54 billion
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